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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts are loathe to vacate arbitration awards. Under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA),' arbitration awards are presumed to be valid and
are generally free from judicial review. 2 In general, arbitration proceedings
need not meet the formal procedural requirements of court adjudication, 3
and awards are generally not reviewable for errors or misinterpretations of
fact or law. 4 Arbitration awards are usually vacated only under the grounds
specified in section 10 of the FAA. 5 The burden of establishing such
grounds rests on the party seeking to upset the award. 6
Aside from "corruption, fraud, or undue means," 7 which also
encompasses parties to the arbitration, 8 vacatur of an award under section
10 of the FAA focuses on the role of the arbitrator only. 9 One of the more
problematic grounds for vacatur is "evident partiality" as delineated in
section 10(a) of the Act.10 It has generally been difficult for courts to
* 146 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1998).
S9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
2 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)-(b) (1994).
3 See JOHN W. COOLEY & STEVEN LUBEr, ARBrrATION ADVOCACY 6 (1997).
4 See id. at 211.
5 See id. at 210.
6 Seeid. at 211.
7 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1).
8 See 4 IAN MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBrrRATION LAW § 40.2 (1994).
9 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2)-(4). Subsection (a)(2) considers partiality or corruption
of the arbitrator; (a)(3) considers misconduct of the arbitrator; (a)(4) considers
abuse/misuse of power by the arbitrator.
10 The FAA states:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award
upon the application of any party to the arbitration-
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
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formulate a precise legal standard to the concept of evident partiality." For
a showing of evident partiality, the standard is that there has to be more
than just the appearance of bias, but less than actual bias.12 Exactly what
this means in practical terms has been somewhat elusive.
Generally, the grounds for vacating arbitration awards are narrower
than those under which courts generally overturn decisions. 13 Because of
this, the courts have vacated awards in very few of the cases in which they
have been challenged. 14 The argument of bias has met with little success. 15
Despite the implications of the statute, 16 the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), 17 the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) rules, 18 and the Supreme Court, 19 "implied partiality" has been
most often held to mean "actual partiality," 20 putting a heavy burden of
proof on the moving party.21
11 See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A.2d 88, 96 (R.I. 1991) (citing
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 323 v. Coral Elec. Corp., 104
F.R.D. 88, 89 (S.D. Fla. 1985)).
12 See id.
13 See Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, Construction and Application of
§ 10(a)(1)-(3) of Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C.S. § 10(a)(1)-(3)) Providing for
Vacating of Arbitration Awards Where Award Procured by Fraud, Corruption, or
Undue Means, Where Arbitrators Evidence Partiality or Corruption and Where
Arbitrators Engage in Particular Acts of Misbehavior, 141 A.L.R. FED. 1, 35 (1997);
see also infra Part 11.
14 See Campbell, supra note 13, at 35. According to this one author, courts vacate
arbitration awards in only about 10% of challenges. See id.
15 See id. The compilation of cases indicates that § 10(a)(4) vacaturs outnumber all
other successful grounds combined. See id.
16 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (1994).
17 "An arbitrator should disclose any interest or relationship likely to affect
impartiality or which might create an appearance of partiality or bias." American
Arbitration Association, The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes,
Canon II (visited Sept. 28, 1998) <http://www.adr.org/code.html>.
18 The NASD rules impose a continuing obligation for arbitrators to disclose
relationships "that are likely to affect impartiality or might reasonably create an
appearance of partiality or bias." NATIONAL ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, NASD CODE OF
ARBITRATION PROCEDURE, IM 10312(a)(2), reprinted in W. REESE BADER, SECURITIES
ARBITRATION: PRACTICE AND FORMS at NASD-17 (1997) (emphasis added).
19 See generally Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S.
145 (1968) (plurality opinion).
20 "[T]he alleged partiality must be 'direct, definite, and capable of demonstration
rather than remote, uncertain, and speculative."' Lifecare Int'l, Inc. v. CD Med., Inc.,
68 F.3d 429, 433 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675
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In the recent decision of Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v.
ADM Investor Services, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals took a
step in clarifying the implied partiality standard in that circuit, aligning it
with the majority view. 22 In its holding, the court effectively ruled out the
possibility of vacatur for bias unless actual bias is shown. In so doing, the
court set out a clear test for determining bias and overturned a previous
district court opinion.
II. THE FACTS OF THE CASE
In 1992, Basic Commodities (Basic) entered into an agreement with
ADM Investor Services, Inc. (ADM).23 Under this agreement, Basic was to
refer customers to ADM; ADM would then execute commodities trades for
these customers.24 As part of their agreement, Basic had agreed to
indemnify ADM for any losses suffered by Basic clients.25
One of the customers of Basic was Gianelli Money Purchase Plan and
Trust (Gianelli).26 During a nine-month period in 1994-1995, Gianelli lost
approximately $100,000 as a result of investments in the futures market
through ADM and Basic.27 Gianelli, blaming the losses on mismanagement
by Basic's president, Kent C. Kelley, filed a claim against ADM with the
American Arbitration Association, asserting that ADM was liable for the
losses caused by Kelley based on a theory of agency. 28
The arbitrator selected by both parties was Keith Houck.29
Unbeknownst to Gianelli at the time of the selection, Houck had worked
for the law firm that had represented Kelley in 1992-Gray, Harris &
Robinson (Gray Harris).30 Shortly before the arbitration hearing, Gianelli
F.2d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 1982)).
21 Given the poor track record in obtaining vacatur on the ground of bias, it is clear
that parties bear a heavy burden. See supra note 15; see also Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc. v. Pyles, 701 F. Supp. 217, 220 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
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discovered this fact. 31 Mr. Houck then asserted that he did not remember
the 1992 representation and signed an Arbitrator's Oath of full disclosure. 32
Mr. Kelley also stated that the 1992 representation by Gray Harris was an
isolated incident. 33 Based on these representations, Gianelli accepted Houck
as the arbitrator. 34
Subsequent to the arbitration decision favoring ADM, Gianelli
discovered that Kelley and Gray Harris indeed had an ongoing attorney-
client relationship for over sixteen years. 35 Most of this relationship
predated Houck's employment. 36 Gianelli then filed a petition to the district
court to vacate the arbitration award, contending that Houck, because of his
employment by Gray Harris and relationship with Kelley, had shown
partiality to ADM. 37
The issue was heard before a magistrate judge, who recommended that
the district court vacate the arbitration award. 38 Concluding that "the
arbitrator had displayed 'evident partiality' because of [the] past business
[relationship]," 39 the district court adopted the recommendation of vacatur,
from which ADM appealed. 4°
The court of appeals reversed. In discussing the standard of review, the
court concluded that orders vacating arbitration awards are reviewed for
clear error with respect to facts and de novo with respect to the legal
conclusions. 41 On both these points, the court found the district court in
error.
First, as a matter of fact, it found that there was not evidence of
partiality. In reaching this conclusion, the court viewed evident partiality
from the perspective of the arbitrator, not the party to the dispute. 42
According to the appellate court, the district court had found that "Kelley's









39 Id. at 1309.
40 See id. at 1310.
41 See id. at 1311.
42 See id. at 1312.
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person to conclude that Houck 'was tainted with evident partiality."' 43 The
appeals court, though, concluded that to show partiality, a party would
have to demonstrate that the arbitrator had actual knowledge of the past
contacts, not just that there could have been contacts. 44
The appellate court rejected the district court's finding that a
reasonable perception of partiality met the requirements of section 10(a). 45
In reversing the decision, the court set out two specific criteria for
determining evident partiality. To show evident partiality on the part of an
arbitrator, the person seeking vacatur would have to show "either (1) an
actual conflict exists, or (2) the arbitrator knows of, but fails to disclose,
information which would lead a reasonable person to believe that a
potential conflict exists. ' 46 "Because Houck did not have actual knowledge
of the information upon which the alleged 'conflict' was founded, the
second 'evident partiality' condition is not present in this case." 47
III. THE DETERMINATION OF PARTIALITY
The holding of Gianelli is in keeping with the general policy that the
FAA provides for vacatur of an arbitration award only in extremely narrow
circumstances. 48 This is a longstanding policy of arbitration as well:
"Every presumption is in favor of the validity of the award." 49 In addition,
vacatur under section 10(a)(2) of the FAA has been particularly difficult
because the definition of evident partiality has been particularly elusive.5 0
43 Id. at 1311-1312.
44 See id. at 1312.
45 In vacating the arbitration, the district court had relied on Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20
F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 1994). See Gianelli, 146 F.3d at 1312. The Schmitz court found that
the arbitrator had a duty to investigate potential conflicts and disclose that his firm had
performed legal work for one of the party's corporate parents. See Schmitz, 20 F.3d at
1048-1049. The court concluded that the failure of the arbitrator to perform this duty
created a reasonable perception of partiality allowing for vacatur whether or not actual
partiality existed. See id. at 1049.
46 Gianelli, 146 F.3d at 1312 (citing Lifecare Int'l, Inc. v. CD Med., Inc., 68 F.3d
429, 433 (11th Cir. 1995)).
47 Id. at 1313.
48 See Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Transportation
Communications Int'l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that a "judicial
review of an arbitration award is among the narrowest known to the law").
49 Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 350 (1855) (upholding an arbitration
award).
50 "'Evident partiality,' like obscenity, is an elusive concept: one knows it when
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At the root of this uncertainty is the difficulty that courts have had in
interpreting the only Supreme Court case addressing this issue. Most
arguments for vacatur under section 10 of the FAA are based on the
plurality opinion of Justice Black in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v.
Continental Casualty Co.51 The plurality opinion of Commonwealth
Coatings tried to determine the range of acceptable arbitrator partiality by
determining "whether elementary requirements of impartiality taken for
granted in every judicial proceeding are suspended when the parties agree
to resolve a dispute through arbitration." 52 Justice Black seemed to indicate
that the mere appearance of possible bias in an arbitrator was sufficient for
vacatur on grounds of evident partiality under section 10(a)(2) of the
FAA. 53 The implication is that arbitrators are subject to similar standards of
impartiality as Article III judges. Under this standard, adopted only by a
minority of courts, virtually any relationship between an arbitrator and a
party would be open to a challenge.
In practice, however, vacatur of arbitral awards for partiality under
section 10(a)(2) are generally unsuccessful. 54 "Although Commonwealth
Coatings was the Supreme Court's first and only word on the matter," 55 it
has provided little true guidance. Even among the justices, there was
disagreement as to the exact threshold requiring disclosure. Justice White,
in his concurring opinion, "criticized the plurality's stringent disclosure
requirements as undesirable as a matter of policy." 56
The majority of United States courts considering the matter have
one sees it .... No jurist has yet coined an exacting legal standard for 'evident
partiality,' although many have tried." International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local
Union No. 323 v. Coral Elec. Corp., 104 F.R.D. 88, 89 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
51 393 U.S. 145 (1968) (plurality opinion).
52 Id. at 145. Although the court cited section 10(a) of the FAA as its reason for
vacating the award, the main justification was derived from evident partiality in section
10(b). See id. at 147-149.
53 See id. at 150. Note that at the time of the opinion, the "evident partiality"
clause was in 9 U.S.C. § 10(b).
54 See Eric Lucentini, Note, Taking a Fresh Look at Vacatur of Awards Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 7 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 359, 360 (1996). The refusal of most
courts to adopt an "appearance of bias" test is derived from their reluctance to interfere
with a process defined by its consensual nature because parties to commercial
arbitration have voluntarily opted out of the judicial system and therefore live with their
decision. See Matthew D. Disco, The Impression of Possible Bias: What a Neutral
Arbitrator Must Disclose in California, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 113, 115-119 (1993).
55 Lucentini, supra note 54, at 360.
56 Id.
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generally adopted Justice White's approach. 57 Justice White in concurring
did not want to decide what standard should be applied to arbitrators, 58 but
rather thought that "[t]he judiciary should minimize its role in arbitration as
judge of the arbitrator's impartiality." 59 Courts have generally agreed that
the mere appearance of bias standard of the Commonwealth Coatings
plurality is too stringent.60 One reason the parties prefer arbitration is the
expertise of the arbitrator. The requirements of a certain level of expertise
invariably leads to a small pool of arbitrators to choose from. Because of
this, it would be impracticable to apply judicial standards for the
disqualification of arbitrators. This would invariably lead to the
disqualification of virtually every arbitrator. On the other hand, with too
high a standard, such as proof of actual bias, it would be almost impossible
to disqualify an arbitrator without a public announcement of partiality. 61
This is why courts have held that evident partiality exists when a
"reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to
one of the parties in the arbitration." 62
This does not mean that arbitrators are required to disclose every
interest or bias which might affect their judgment. Arbitrators are not
required to give "complete and unexpurgated" business biographies. 63
57 See, e.g., Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 760
(11th Cir. 1993); Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d
141, 146 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that the mere appearance of bias by itself does not
constitute evident partiality); Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1358
n.19 (6th Cir. 1989) (agreeing with the Second Circuit view that the Commonwealth
Coatings plurality discussion of appearance of possible bias should be considered dicta);
International Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir. 1981); United
States Wrestling Fed'n v. Wrestling Div. of AAU, Inc., 605 F.2d 313, 319 (7th Cir.
1979) (treating Justice White's opinion as authoritative and Justice Black's as dictum);
Dowd v. First Omaha Sec. Corp., 242 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Neb. 1993) (noting that courts
have followed the reasoning in Justice White's concurrence in Commonwealth Coatings
rather than the appearance of bias standard).
58 See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150 (stating that, in Justice White's
view, "[tihe Court does not decide today that arbitrators are to be held to the standards
of judicial decorum of Article III judges, or indeed of any judges").
59 Id. at 151.
60 See Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit
Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that the Commonwealth Coatings
Court's failure to achieve consensus exhibits a source for continued uncertainty as to the
appropriate standard to apply to arbitrator relationships).
61 See Campbell, supra note 13, at 75.
62 Id.
63 Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 151 (White, J., concurring); see also
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However, the prudent practice is for arbitrators to "disclose fully all their
relationships with the parties, whether these ties be of a direct or indirect
nature." 64 Despite the nature of the challenged relationship, courts will
often refuse to vacate when the relationship, although undisclosed, was
known by the party or its employees 65 or where the parties failed to object
in a timely manner. 66
IV. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT APPROACH IN GIANELLI
In an apparent attempt to broaden the scope of review under section 10
of the FAA, the circuit court in Gianelli adopted the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit in Schmitz v. Zilveti.67 The Schmitz reasoning subscribed to a strict
reading of Justice Black's opinion which creates a duty to disclose similar
to the appearance of bias as well as the actual partiality standards. The
broad standard thus created is not all that different from the standards
imposed by ethical canons, as is evident by the court's need to cite the
NASD arbitration code68 and several opinions on attorney conflicts of
interest. 69
Although Schmitz did cite Eleventh Circuit case law, the citation was
for a tangential proposition and not for the core question of the factors
which constitute evident partiality under the FAA. 70 The actual holding of
Schmitz was contrary to the law of the Eleventh Circuit,71 and adoption of
the Schmitz rationale would mean adopting the minority of courts' broad
Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that
the disclosure of every former social or financial relationship with a party or its
principals is not required); Reed & Martin, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 439 F.2d
1268, 1275 (2d Cir. 1971).
64 Sanko S.S. Co. v. Cook Indus., Inc., 495 F.2d 1260, 1264 (2d Cir. 1973).
65 See Cook Indus., Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co., 449 F.2d 106, 107-108 (2d Cir. 1971)
(holding that a party could not challenge an arbitrator for bias where the party knew of
an otherwise improper relationship).
66 See Health Servs. Management Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1263 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding that an objection made two months after first learning of the relationship
between two out of three arbitrators and the prevailing party was untimely).
67 20 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 1994).
68 See id. at 1049.
69 See id.
70 See Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 146
F.3d 1309, 1312 & n.1 (11th Cir. 1998).
71 See id. at 1312.
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interpretation of Commonwealth,72 overruling Eleventh Circuit case law. 73
This the appellate court refused to do.
Thus, the appellate court clarified that the Eleventh Circuit follows the
majority view of Commonwealth.74 This view had been previously stated
by the Eleventh Circuit in Lifecare International, Inc. v. CD Medical,
Inc.75 and Middlesex Mutual Insurance Co. v. Levine.76 The affirmation of
Lifecare is in keeping with a general reluctance to tamper with a process
defined by its consensual nature, recognizing that one of the reasons for
selecting arbitration over litigation is to subject the dispute to a tribunal
with particular subject matter expertise. Indeed, the demand for pristine
arbitrator impartiality is unrealistic because it is precisely the arbitrators'
status as "men of affairs, not apart from... the marketplace" 77 that makes
arbitration a speedy and inexpensive alternative to courtroom litigation.
Under these circumstances, prior contact between one of the parties and the
arbitrator is possible and perhaps even likely. 78 Therefore, courts tend to be
amenable to the necessary trade-off between expertise and impartiality. 79
The test laid out in Lifecare is objective. Evident partiality under the
72 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147-150
(1968).
73 See Gianelli, 146 F.3d at 1312.
74 See id. at 1312-1313.
75 68 F.3d 429 (11th Cir. 1995).
76 675 F.2d 1197 (11th Cir. 1982).
77 Commonwealth, 393 U.S. at 150 (White, J., concurring).
78 A relationship between the arbitrator and the party or its representatives is
unlikely to receive vacatur of an award unless the alliance is out of the ordinary course
of business and is so "intimate-personally, socially, professionally, or financially-as
to cast serious doubt" on the arbitrator's impartiality. Drinane v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 584 N.E.2d 410, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (McMorrow, J., specially
concurring) (citing Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 680 (7th Cir.
1983)).
79 For example, the Second Circuit stated:
Familiarity with a discipline often comes at the expense of complete
impartiality.... [S]pecific areas tend to breed tightly-knit professional
communities. Key members are known to one another, and in fact may work with,
or for, one another, from time to time. As this court has noted, "[e]xpertise in an
industry is accompanied by exposure, in ways large and small, to those engaged in
it."
Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Corp., 748 F.2d
79, 83 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co.,
579 F.2d 691, 701 (2d Cir. 1978)).
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FAA exists only when "(1) an actual conflict exists, or (2) the arbitrator
knows of, but fails to disclose, information which would lead a reasonable
person to believe that a potential conflict exists."' 80 By adopting this
objective test, Gianelli establishes a workable solution for the Eleventh
Circuit. 81 Under this test, the actual existence of partiality is less important
than disclosure in the first instance. Thus, the review of the court is limited
to examining the nature of disclosure and the final outcome for fairness, not
the process of the arbitration itself.82 Additionally, although parties may
bargain for additional arbitration terms, the FAA itself only provides for
arbitral review in very narrow circumstances. 83
Gianelli is consistent with the emerging standard that "a reasonable
80 Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 146 F.3d
1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).
81 This objective test is more akin to what has been labeled as "active" partiality
meaning that the arbitrator has acted in a manner suggesting partiality. See 3 IAN
MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 8, § 28.8.
82 This is not to say that higher standards may not be applied by the parties.
Certainly the rules employed by private arbitration institutions such as the NASD, the
AAA, as well as the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial
Disputes, provide extensive disclosure. For example, section 19 of the AAA
Commercial Arbitration rules considers "any past" relationship of an arbitrator with the
parties or their representatives to constitute a "circumstance likely to affect impartiality"
which must be disclosed. AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES § 19 (1996). The
AAA/ABA Code of Ethics is even more stringent, requiring arbitrators to avoid any
"financial, business, professional, family or social relationship" which could
"reasonably create the impression of partiality or bias." AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS
FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DIsPuTEs Canon I (1977); see also discussion supra
note 18.
83 Judge Posner noted:
[E]ven if the failure to disclose was a material violation of the ethical standards
applicable to arbitration proceedings, it does not follow that the arbitration
award may be nullified judicially. Although we have great respect for the
Commercial Arbitration Rules and the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators, they are
not the proper starting point for an inquiry into an award's validity under
section 10 of the United States Arbitration Act and Rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
[A commercial arbitration service] may set its standards as high or as
low as it thinks its customers want. The statute has a different purpose-to
make arbitration effective by putting the coercive force of the federal courts
behind [it] ....
Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 680-681 (7th Cir. 1983).
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person would have to conclude that the neutral arbitrator was partial or
exhibited conduct, attitude, or disposition favoring one party for vacation to
be proper." 84 The purpose of arbitration is not to recreate a judicial setting,
but to arrive at economical and fair results in an alternative setting. 85 By
narrowing judicial inquiry of the arbitral process, the courts help to
reinforce the validity of this alternative forum by giving it a strong degree
of finality.
V. CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit's holding clarifies the trend of the courts in
reviewing partiality in arbitration. The court set out a simplified inquiry
requiring either actual conflict or failure of the arbitrator to disclose
information that would lead a reasonable person to believe that a potential
conflict exists. Therefore, the emphasis is on ensuring an equitable
bargaining position and not on procedural review. In so doing, the Eleventh
Circuit reaffirmed the fundamental purpose of arbitration, which is "to
relieve congestion in the courts and to provide parties with an alternative
method for dispute resolution that would be speedier and less costly than
litigation. " 86
Eric M. Sommers
84 Deseriee A. Kennedy, Predisposed with Integrity: The Elusive Quest for Justice
in Tripartite Arbitrations, 8 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICs 749, 775 (1995). This article offers
a good overview of arbitrators' ethical roles. See id. at 773-781.
85 "The purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act [is] to relieve congestion in the
courts and to provide parties with an alternative method for dispute resolution that
would be speedier and less costly than litigation." O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Professional
Planning Assoc., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 745 (1lth Cir. 1988) (citing Ultracashmere
House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 1981)).
8r- Id.

